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THE PRAGMATIC RISE OF CHINA: U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL 1997 – 2012 
 
By 
 
JEONG, Hae Yeon 
 
As a rising political, economic, and military power, China has responded to worldwide 
attention by playing a more active role in regional and global multilateral regimes. This paper 
focuses on how China's multilateral strategy has evolved in the UNSC between 1997 and 
2012. What important factors led to the seven vetoes since 1997, and how has China's voting 
behavior changed over this time period? A thorough analysis of the official UNSC documents 
show that the ultimate goal for China is to secure the Chinese interests and compete for more 
decision-making power upon the global stage. China’s voting behavior in the UNSC strongly 
support China’s pragmatism in multilateralism; to continue high economic growth and 
relationship building, China has become highly sensitive to the changing international norms 
and constraints of multilateralism, while gaining international support especially from the 
developing countries of Africa and Southeast Asia. China is consistently aware of the UNSC 
mandate, and will continue to vote with firm positions on state sovereignty and internal 
affairs, clearly because China has a strong interest and desire to avoid foreign intervention in 
its own affairs. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
JEONG, HAE YEON (Full legal name) 
2012 (Year of publication) 
i 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
First and foremost, I praise God, the Almighty for providing me this opportunity and granting 
me the capability to proceed successfully. This thesis appears in its current form due to the 
assistance and guidance of several people. I would therefore like to offer my sincere thanks to 
all of them. 
 
I want to acknowledge my esteemed supervisor, Professor Byung-Joon Ahn, who in my third 
semester got me interested in international politics and broadened my academic pursuit into 
the field of international politics and foreign diplomacy. I truly thank Professor Ahn for his 
warm encouragement, thoughtful guidance, critical comments, and correction of the thesis. 
 
My deep thanks also go to my dear friends for being constantly supportive. To my fellow 
2011 MPP colleagues, words cannot express my sincere thankfulness to all of you. Thank 
you for reassuring me when I doubted my ability to complete this paper and provided a 
necessary dose of humor and sanity along the way. Without whatever information and 
suggestions you have all provided me, I would never survive the pains of writing this thesis. I 
love you all like family, really. To Ji Eun Kim and Hae Lim Lee, thank you both for your 
moral support. You both always had the tendency to phone just in time and save me from 
some late-night “men-boongs.” Though we seem to be on different tracks now, our friendship 
will always help me survive the difficult time (if there is any) in the future. To Chelsea Park, 
Jeena Lee, Mina Jang, and Ahra Cho, thank you for thinking of me when you say your 
prayers. Your encouraging words keep me working on with the greatest amount of patience. I 
am so glad we all somehow found each other in oh-so-cold-and-dreary Minnesota. To Soo 
ii 
 
Jung Moon and Jenny Lee, thank you for all the food therapy sessions. Your moral support 
and amazing food therapy brings me a lot of warmth. 
 
Last but not least, I want to express my deepest thanks to my parents and MJ. My gratitude is 
beyond words. I am deeply indebted to their unfailing support, both in the emotional, spiritual, 
and financial aspects. During this whole process, they were very patient and supportive of 
whatever decisions I made. Their words of encouragement and to not be afraid of challenges 
were what kept me going. To momsie, daddykins, and dongs, thank you, thank you, thank 
you. Without any of you, I can never make my thesis and degree possible. 
 
Thank you all for everything. 
iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ONE.  INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 
I. METHODOLOGY AND ROADMAP ........................................................................................ 3 
II. DEFINING KEY CONCEPTS ................................................................................................. 5 
A. United Nations Security Council and the (hidden) veto ............................................. 5 
B. Chapter VII resolutions .............................................................................................. 6 
C. Multilateralism ........................................................................................................... 7 
D. Pragmatism ................................................................................................................. 7 
TWO.  BRIEF BACKGROUND: CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY .................................... 8 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY ................................................................ 8 
II. CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY............................................................................................... 9 
THREE.  FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS: PRAGMATISM IN IR THEORY ............. 11 
I. TWO DOMINANT THEORIES ............................................................................................. 11 
A. Realism .................................................................................................................... 11 
B. Liberalism ................................................................................................................ 12 
II. DEWEYAN – A PRAGMATIST IR THEORY ........................................................................ 13 
FOUR.  LITERATURE REVIEW ON CHINA’S FOREIGN RELATIONS .................. 14 
I. LIBERALISTS – SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATIONISTS .............................................................. 14 
II. REALISTS – DOOMSDAY PESSIMISTS ............................................................................... 15 
III. PRAGMATISTS OF VARIOUS KINDS .................................................................................. 16 
IV. CHINA AS A UNSC P5 MEMBER: 1971 – 1999 ................................................................ 19 
FIVE.  THE SELFISH VETOES: 1997 AND 1999 VETOES ........................................... 21 
I. GUATEMALA ................................................................................................................... 21 
II. MACEDONIA ................................................................................................................... 23 
SIX.  REBUILDING ITS REPUTATION: BETWEEN 1999 AND 2006 ......................... 27 
 
SEVEN.  THE CONFIDENT VETOES: 2007 AND 2009 VETOES ................................ 32 
I. MYANMAR ...................................................................................................................... 32 
iv 
 
II. ZIMBABWE ...................................................................................................................... 34 
EIGHT.  THE STUBBORN VETOES: THRICE ON SYRIA .......................................... 39 
NINE.  CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 43 
I. SUMMING UP .................................................................................................................. 43 
II. WHAT’S NEXT?............................................................................................................... 45 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 47 
 
 
 
v 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
1. UNSC veto record        2 
2. China’s veto record since 1997      2 
3. China’s abstention record since 1997     28 
 
1 
 
ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In order to further understand China’s role in multilateral affairs, this paper examines 
China’s voting behavior in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). But why China, 
why the UNSC, and why now? As an emerging leader in the international stage, China is 
increasingly gaining attention for its rise in economic, military, and political power. This 
increasing attention has led to various scholars theorizing on China’s dynamic role and 
participation in multilateral institutions. The UNSC is a global multilateral regime with 
representation from both developed and developing nations. Under the UNSC’s institutional 
framework, China acts as a unique permanent member amongst others that are of European 
descent, democratic, and developed nations. Additionally, with the ongoing UNSC expansion 
debate since the early 1990s, an analysis of the UNSC is timely. As debates are getting heated, 
various governments are in a conundrum regarding how to deal with the question of 
additional permanent seats, the question of veto power for these new additional seats. 
Therefore, it is imperative and timely to understand China’s recent multilateralism in the 
context of the UNSC. 
 Ever since the People’s Republic of China officially replaced Taiwan in 1971, the 
nation has casted a total of nine vetoes in the UNSC. Although this may be an incredibly low 
veto record when compared to the other permanent members, since seven of those vetoes 
were casted since 1997, a strikingly high veto rate can be observed. 
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Table 1. UNSC veto record 
 CHINA FRANCE RUSSIA UK US TOTAL 
SINCE 
1946 9 18 125 32 82 265 
SINCE 
1997 7 0 6 0 12 23 
 
As seen above in Table 1, the United States (US) has casted a total twelve vetoes, 
Russia six, while France and the United Kingdom (UK) have a zero voting record since 1997. 
In 1997, 
 Table 2. China’s veto record since 1997 
DATE AGENDA ITEM VOTING RECORD 
10 January 1997 Guatemala 14-1-0 
25 February 1999 Macedonia 13-1-1 
12 January 2007 Myanmar 9-3-3 
11 July 2008 Zimbabwe 9-5-1 
4 October 2011 Syria 9-2-4 
4 February 2012 Syria 13-0-2 
19 July 2012 Syria 11-2-2 
   * Voting Record numbers denote votes: (in favor – against – abstain) 
China vetoed against a resolution concerning efforts towards peace in Guatemala. Two years 
later, in 1999, China’s veto was against a resolution regarding the situation in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Interestingly, a large gap can be observed in China’s 
refrain from using the veto for eight years between 1999 and 2006. In 2007 and 2008, Russia 
and China double vetoed a draft resolution concerning Myanmar and Zimbabwe. More 
recently, in 2011 and 2012, Russia and China once again double-vetoed a resolution 
concerning the Middle East crisis in Syria.  
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I. Methodology and Roadmap 
What are the underlying reasons for China’s voting behavior in the UNSC? Under 
what circumstance does China resort to its veto power? More specifically, I use China in the 
UNSC (1997-2012) as a case study to answer the larger question: what does the evolving 
voting behavior reveal about China as an emerging rising power? This research is important 
for two reasons. First, the research inspects China’s multilateralism in the context of a global 
multilateral regime. The current literature of Chinese multilateralism is primarily based on 
understanding China’s behavior in regional multilateral institutions. The literature on 
Chinese multilateralism will benefit my research, which examines China as a global player on 
a global stage like the UNSC. Second, there is a disappointingly limited amount of research 
about China in the UNSC and its voting behavior. Furthermore, the existing published 
findings are outdated. My analysis of China’s recent 2007-2012 vetoes will supplement and 
update the existing literature. 
 To answer the research question, I analyze primary sources that concern China’s 
seven vetoes and voting records through electronically accessible documents of the UNSC 
press releases, meeting records, and draft resolutions. Then, I compare my findings with the 
dominant theories of Chinese multilateralism. This disciplined interpretive case study method 
is most suitable for interpreting new events and changes to identify factors, and further 
understanding how they relate to existing theories of Chinese global multilateralism. 
 I identify China’s four phases in the UNSC from 1997 to 2012. The 1997 and 1999 
veto against Guatemala and Macedonia mark the first phase, which I have called The Selfish 
Vetoes, in which China boldly clarifies its stance on the question of Taiwan. The second 
phase, named Rebuilding its Reputation, is between May 1999 and 2006, in which China 
avoids the use of veto and abstains when unable to fully support a resolution. I frame the third 
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phase as The Confident Vetoes with the 2007 and 2008 vetoes regarding the situations of 
Myanmar and Zimbabwe. Lastly, The Stubborn Vetoes is the fourth phase whereby I analyze 
the recent 2011-2012 vetoes regarding the crisis in Syria. In this final two phases, China is 
more assertive in casting the veto because of its support from a significant number of other 
member states and multilateral regimes — especially those from developing nations of 
Southeast Asia and Africa. Based on these findings, I assert that China’s actions in the UNSC 
firmly attest to the pragmatist theory of China’s multilateralism. With an emphasis on 
maintaining high economic growth and building strong international relationships, China has 
become highly sensitive to the changing international norms and constraints of 
multilateralism. 
 My argument adheres to the following structure. I first outline the UNSC’s voting 
procedures, the Chapter VII resolution, and what I mean by multilateralism and pragmatism. 
Second, I briefly cover the background behind the evolution of China’s foreign policy and its 
current foreign policy. Third, I touch upon the importance of pragmatism in International 
Relations theory. Then, fourth, I review the literature regarding China’s multilateral 
diplomacy. As mentioned earlier, there are two areas of literature I am covering. First is the 
general literature of Chinese multilateralism, and second is the more specific and limited 
literature on China in the UNSC. I then divide the main analysis of China’s UNSC voting 
record into three sections in order from earliest to most recent, each beginning with a 
description of the case. The first section is the 1997 and 1999 vetoes. The second surveys the 
seven years (1999 to 2006) in which China refrains from the use of veto. The third section 
focuses on 2007 and 2008, while the fourth and final section highlights the three vetoes cast 
between 2011-2012. The analysis concludes by reiterating how my findings compare to the 
existing dominant theories of Chinese multilateralism. 
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II. Defining Key Concepts 
At this stage, it is important to establish some working definitions for key concepts 
explored in the paper. Before proceeding further, I feel compelled to restate Charles Tilly’s 
advice on attempts to define large social processes, that “although definitions as such cannot 
be true or false, in social science useful definitions should point to detectable phenomena that 
exhibit some degree of causal coherence.”1 In this section, I provide information about the 
UNSC, its voting rules, the hidden veto, Chapter VII resolutions, and multilateralism.   
 
A. United Nations Security Council and the (hidden) veto 
The UNSC body is composed of five permanent members and ten non-permanent 
members. The five permanent members, also commonly referred to as the P5, are China, 
France, Russia, the UK, and the US. The UN General Assembly (GA) elects ten non-
permanent members of the UNSC for two-year terms starting on January 1, with five 
replaced each year. Regional representation is important for the non-permanent member 
states. The African bloc elects three countries, while the Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Asian, and Western European select two countries each, and the Eastern European bloc 
chooses one country. An Arab country is also represented, and alternates from the Asian and 
the African bloc.    
 Under the UN Charter Article 27, paragraph 3, at least nine members of the Security 
Council must vote affirmatively for a resolution to pass. A negative vote by a permanent 
member is counted as a veto, in which case the resolution will not pass. In voting, members 
can vote in favor, against, or abstain. An absence or abstention, however, is not considered a 
veto. When permanent members are unwilling to support a draft resolution, but are also 
unwilling to veto, they often resort to abstention. 
                                                 
1 Charles Tilly, “Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists,” Sociological Theory 22, no. 1 (2004): 8. 
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Despite the diminished number of vetoes in the post-Cold War era, Senior Advisor to 
Global Policy Forum Celine Nahory explains the continued use of the permanent member’s 
hidden veto, the silent threat of possible veto use. The hidden veto has multiple effects. First, 
the hidden veto controls the UNSC agenda. There is an unwritten taboo list that the UNSC 
never discusses because they are issues that P5 states consider to be issues of internal affairs. 
The taboo crises are Chechnya, Colombia, Northern Ireland, Sudan, Taiwan, Tibet, and 
Uganda.2  Even when a P5-sensitive issue is adopted in the UNSC agenda, the hidden veto is 
used to prevent the resolution from passing by stating that they “refuse to support.” This 
ambiguous phrasing could be interpreted either as an intention to veto or abstain. Elected 
non-permanent members also quickly learn the taboo topics, and consequently engage in a 
self-censorship process by avoiding sensitive topics. Nahory identifies this self-censorship as 
the double hidden veto. Nahory’s concept of the hidden veto is important when later 
discussing China’s use of it in 2005 regarding the UNSC expansion agenda.  
 
B. Chapter VII resolutions 
My research will examine Chapter VII resolutions, and so, I shall define it here by 
borrowing Zaum’s description: 
The UN Security Council can assert authority over a territory under Chapter 
VII, and has the right to delegate this authority to a transitional 
administration … to take all necessary measures to maintain or restore 
international peace and security, even without the consent of the affected 
states.3 
 
In other words, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council is 
deemed able to apply any sort of enforcement measures on a country for the sake of restoring 
                                                 
2 Celine Nahory, “Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council,” Global Policy Forum, 
2008, http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Z/Tables_and_Charts/useofveto.pdf. 
3 Dominik Zaum, “The Authority of International Administrations in International Society,” Review of 
International Studies 32 (2006): 461. 
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international peace and security. Such measures, for example, range from economic and/or 
other sanctions not involving the use of armed forces to international military action. 
 
C. Multilateralism 
I employ Keohane’s definition of multilateralism, which is the “practice of 
coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements 
or by means of institutions.” 4  This definition underlines two principles of international 
multilateralism, that is, one of “multilateral institutional involvement and that of policy 
practice substantively affected by such involvement.”5 
 
D. Pragmatism 
Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition centered on knowledge, existence and socio-
political affairs. Pragmatists place immense importance on the idea that “human experience is 
not simply a spectator-like event or a matter of grasping the unique essences of objects in the 
world around us.” 6  Instead, experience is seen as “a series of active engagements or 
interactions between an organism and its environment.” 7 In other words, people tend to 
utilize their surrounding circumstances to their benefit — whether by probing into problems 
or engaging in some sort of political action — and, in turn, their behaviors and perception are 
transformed by the interactions.  
                                                 
4 Robert O. Keohane, “Multilateralism: an Agenda for Research,” International Journal 45, no. 4 (1990): 731. 
5 1. Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne, “International Multilateralism with Chinese Characteristics: Attitude 
Changes, Policy Imperatives, and Regional Impacts,” in China Turns to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy and 
Regional Security, ed. Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 5. 
6 John P. Diggins, The Promise of Pragmatism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 219. 
7 Ibid. 
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TWO 
BRIEF BACKGROUND: CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY 
 
I. The Evolution of China’s Foreign Policy 
Ever since China formally established itself as the People’s Republic of China in 1949, 
the nation’s foreign policy has often been known to emphasize sovereignty and non-
intervention. 8 This somewhat stubborn idea is derived from China’s past experiences of 
victimization from other nation-states, and its persistence to govern an ambitious and utopian 
idea of a unified and cohesive “one-China” — one that includes controversial territories of 
Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang.9 Thus, these experiences have catalyzed China to emphasize 
sovereignty and non-intervention. 
In 1953 and 1954, China’s First Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai advocated 
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence which once again highlighted China’s foreign 
policy framework: (1) mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-
aggression; (3) mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; (4) mutual benefit and 
equality; and lastly, (5) the overall peaceful coexistence.10 Throughout the Cold War, China 
exercised absolute loyalty to these five principles by abstaining from any of the UNSC’s 
attempt to deploy peacekeeping missions.11  
In the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping emphasized a policy that focused on the nation’s 
economic development called the ‘Bide our Time, Build our Capacities’ (韬光养晦 tāo 
guāng yǎng huì) foreign policy, also known as the ‘low profile’ foreign policy. This in turn 
                                                 
8 Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano, “Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia: How China and Japan Implement the 
Responsibility to Protect,” RSIS Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, Working Paper no. 5 (2011): 10. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Jonathan Davis, “From Ideology to Pragmatism: China’s Position on Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-
Cold War Era,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 44, no. 2 (2011): 225. 
11 Ibid, 226. 
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led to the change in the nation’s strict adherence to sovereignty.12 Especially following the 
1989 Tiananmen Square incident’s foreign criticisms, China’s respect for the principle of 
non-intervention remained an integral part of this policy. 
Ever since the Cold War, Chinese foreign policy has shown “greater moderation, 
engagement, and integration.”13 Specifically in regards to issues on intervention, China has 
changed its views from refusing to participate in peacekeeping intervention missions, to 
assessing and justifying the means of an intervention.14 
 
II. Current Foreign Policy 
According to China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, China has always pursued an 
“independent foreign policy of peace” with China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty 
always coming first. Additionally, he has emphasized that the current Chinese foreign policy 
has aims of not only creating a “favorable environment” for developing China, but also 
advocating world peace.15 
As stated above, China’s foreign policy goals include national security, maintaining 
territorial integrity, and promoting its image in the international stage. 16 However, other 
factors such as China’s economic investments may also have a considerable impact on its 
foreign policy. For example, in 2010, China invested $3.4 billion in foreign direct 
investments into Iran, Algeria, Nigeria, and Sudan. 17  These investments are significant 
because it had a great affect on China’s foreign policy towards these nation-states. 
                                                 
12 Ken Sofer, “China and the Collapse of Noninterventionalist Foreign Policy,” Center for American Progress, 
March 8, 2012, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2012/03/08/11224/china-and-the-
collapse-of-its-noninterventionist-foreign-policy/. 
13 Robert Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 1. 
14 Stephanie Kleine-Ahilbrandt and Andrew Small, “China’s New Dictatorship Diplomacy,” January 28, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/world/20080101faessay_v87n1_kleine.html?pagewanted=all. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Robert Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2007): 7. 
17 Ibid. 
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Even though the aims of China’s foreign policy are rather transparent, at times they 
may seem inconsistent. For instance, regarding the issue of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), 
China’s supposedly ‘strong’ commitment to the principle of non-interference has been 
inconsistent. While China may have sought in promoting an international image as a 
responsible power by supporting the development of R2P, the nation has also at times been 
forced to compromise (ex. the 2011 peacekeeping efforts in Libya). 
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THREE 
FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS: PRAGMATISM IN IR THEORY 
 
Because the goal of this paper will be to analyze what the evolving voting behavior in 
the UNSC reveals about China’s pragmatic rise as an emerging power, it is imperative to 
examine how pragmatism plays a role in International Relations (IR) theory. One of the main 
challenges in delineating IR pragmatist theories is finding a way to clearly define the idea of 
pragmatism. It is generally known that the philosophy of pragmatism does not coincide with 
traditional IR theoretic frameworks — in this case, realism and liberalism. Nevertheless, I 
attempt to outline the two dominant IR theories — realism and liberalism — and suggest a 
connection to pragmatism. 
 
I. Two Dominant IR Theories 
A. Realism 
A renowned 20th Century classical realist thinker, Reinhold Niebhur stated that the 
motivation to make wars and dominate others is innately human.18 Hans Morgenthau, another 
eminent classical realist, observed realism as “power-based interest,” but “not in a fixed or 
acontextual manner; rather, interest is always relative to the social and political situation in 
which foreign policy is crafted” — an admittedly pragmatist notion.19 However, with the new 
wave of realist thinkers (also known as neorealists), the classical realism of Niebhur and 
Morgenthau were very different from what today’s IR scholars believe. Neo-realists define 
the global governance as “an anarchic space, roughly equivalent to a Hobbesian state of 
nature…[in which]…agents compete for geo-political power and influence.”20 Within this 
                                                 
18 Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy 110 (1998): 31. 
19 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 
1978), 10-12. 
20 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 91-93. 
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international stage of competition, offensive realists view each nation-state as innately 
aggressive, while defensive realists view each nation-state as engrossed with national security. 
Furthermore, nation-states also seek to balance their power in relation to other states. 
Specifically, they do so by both domestically accumulating natural resources or military-
economic capabilities and internationally establishing alliances with other nation-states.21  
From a pragmatist viewpoint, realism illustrates a sense of absolutism: a stubborn 
notion of state preferences, a static conception of the international community and a strong 
lean towards the idea of hierarchy with an emphasis on raw power. 
 
B. Liberalism 
Liberalism regards nation-states as plural or non-unitary actors. Unlike realism, 
liberalism makes preferences, not capabilities. Depending on political, economic, and cultural 
factors, these preferences vary between each nation-state. Therefore, the scale of interaction 
amongst nation-states enlarges by including events influenced by increase of security and 
political power, as well as development within the area of culture and economy. Additionally, 
the actions of various agents not affiliated to the state — such as, multi-national corporations, 
institutions, and individuals — are viewed as pertinent to affecting the means of forming 
foreign policy. For liberalists, the social, political, and economic interdependence of intra-
state actors becomes the model for a global order of inter-state relationships.22 As a result, the 
international stage no longer resembles a Hobbesian war of all against all. Rather, it depicts 
an interdependent network of actors with opportunities to amicably coordinate actions, build 
global institutions and develop socio-cultural capital.23 
                                                 
21 Ibid, 116-128. 
22 2. Scott Burchill, “Liberalism,” in Theories of International Relations, ed. Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, 
Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Terry Nardin, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, and Jacqui True (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995), 63. 
23 Helen Milner, “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique,” in Theories of 
International Relations, ed. Stephen Chan and Cerwyn Moore (Thousand Oaks, CA, 2006), 233-235. 
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Interestingly, liberalism’s views on culture and economics can also be seen as a very 
generic IR theory of pragmatism. The many absolutist features of realism, such as fixed state 
motivations and strict adherence to hierarchy, that pragmatists disagree with are not found in 
liberalism. Rather than emphasizing the need to constantly secure power and security, 
pragmatists firmly believe approaching various actions through intelligent means by utilizing 
and consulting best policy-making practices will be more beneficial. 
 
II. Deweyan — A Pragmatist IR Theory 
According to Dewey scholar Stephen M. Walt, “the ‘complete diplomat’ of the future 
should remain cognizant of realism’s emphasis on the inescapable role of power, keep 
liberalism’s awareness of domestic forces in mind, and occasionally reflect on 
constructivism’s vision of change.”24 Likewise, another Dewey scholar by the name of James 
S. Johnston observes that for pragmatists, “different contexts, in which different subject 
matter is under consideration, necessitate different techniques, different approaches, indeed, 
different use of (differing) abstract ideas.” 25 In general, Deweyan IR theory would help 
observe myriads of international problems through meticulous analysis and experimentation 
approaches. Some of these problems may include unjust wages and working conditions 
harbored by multi-national corporations, human rights issues regarding child soldiering and 
human trafficking, as well as illegal trade of drugs and armory. Additionally, most 
importantly, the Deweyan IR theory would also bring rigorous means of observation to 
situations where military force is exercised unilaterally by state or non-state actors, and to 
cases where nation-states seek to achieve narrow goals of increase in political power or 
exclusive control over limited natural resources. 
 
                                                 
24 Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy 110 (1998): 44. 
25 James S. Johnston, Deweyan Inquiry: From Education Theory to Practice (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2009), 33. 
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FOUR 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON CHINA’S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 From the above framework of pragmatism in IR theory, this literature review focuses 
on two specific areas. First, I cover two dominant competing theories of Chinese foreign 
diplomacy — liberalism and realism — and how pragmatism plays a part on each theory. 
Because generally most theories on Chinese foreign relations are observed in context of 
regional multilateralism, I attempt to contribute to this literature by observing the two 
theories in context of global multilateral institution. Second, I specifically narrow my focus to 
literatures that view China as a permanent member in the UNSC. Because of the limited and 
outdated literature on China’s behavior within the UNSC, my analysis of China’s voting 
behavior in the UNSC between 2007, 2008, and 2011-2012 vetoes will add and update the 
already existing literature. 
 
I. Liberalists – Successful Integrationists 
 Liberal scholars view China’s rise to be peaceful and non-threatening. They believe in 
something called ‘neoliberal institutionalism’ whereby international organizations facilitate 
cooperation amongst nations by deterring conflict and building trust. Kent, for instance, 
concludes that as compared to its behaviors prior to the early 1980s, China’s “acceptance of, 
and integration into, the international system have been nothing short of extraordinary.”26 
Lampton believes that “China had gone from trying to build a Third World United Nations 
(to compete with the UN) in the 1960s to wanting the UN to be the principal legitimator of 
the use of force and economic sanctions in the international system.”27Steinfeld argues that 
                                                 
26 Ann Kent, Beyond Compliance: China, International Organizations, and Global Security (Palo Alto: Stanford 
University Press, 2007), 222-223. 
27 David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds (California: University of 
California Press, 2008), 4. 
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China has continuously assimilated itself into the Western economic order and has 
consistently played the rules set and dominated by the West.28 As a strong believer of China’s 
“peaceful rise,” Zheng Bijian argues that China intends to assimilate its drive for 
modernization with economic globalization and as a result, “will not change the international 
order and configuration through violence.” 29  Due to this profuse optimism of China 
becoming a crucial part of the existing international order, liberal scholars believe that the 
encouraging further trade, foreign direct investments, cultural development, and amicable 
foreign diplomacy will lead China into adapting to the existing global governance. 
 
II. Realists – Doomsday Pessimists 
 On the other end of the spectrum, realist scholars view China’s irrational, bellicose, 
and expansionist means as a threat to the global balance of power. Due to their outright 
pessimistic perception of China’s multilateralism, such alarmist scholars also interpret the 
nation’s rapid economic development and heavy investment on its military as a threat to 
regional security. Moreover, various neo-conservatives in the US are particularly guarded of 
China’s rise and active involvement in international organizations because it challenges US 
hegemony and status in the international stage. Mearsheimer, for instance, strongly believes 
that there is almost no leeway for China to successfully become part of the existing 
international order and “China and the United States are destined to be adversaries as China’s 
power grows.”30 Additionally, Jacques believes that the widespread positive view of China 
embracing the existing international order is deeply mistaken. He argues that “an increasingly 
powerful China will seek to shape the world in its own image…[and that]…in coming 
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decades, the West will be confronted with the fact that its systems, institutions and values are 
no longer the only ones on offer.”31 Other scholars go as far as interpreting China’s increased 
military spending as an opportunity for expanding the nation’s sovereignty through the 
initiation of hostile conflicts with neighboring countries. Overall, realists view China’s rise as 
strategically aligning with the nation’s sovereignty and security. 
 
III. Pragmatists of Various Kinds 
 Pragmatism, as stated before, is essentially grounded on the logic of national interest. 
Specifically, this logic of national interest is channeled by security, power and survival of the 
fittest. With Deng Xiaoping’s economic liberalization in the 1980s and China’s increasing 
involvement in international organizations, both new opportunities as well as constraints 
began to hinder the nation’s policy options. Consequently, a pragmatic approach to Chinese 
multilateralism started to develop: selectively implementing international norms that were 
advantageous to its foreign policy, while rejecting others that did not align with its national 
interests. Among the observers in this category, some are cautiously optimistic and others are 
more concerned about the uncertainties that China’s involvement in global multilateralism 
might engender. 
 Cautiously optimistic scholars view China as willing to accept and participate in the 
existing international system but at the same time, mostly utilizing its participation in a 
pragmatic fashion to maximize the country’s national interest. They believe that China 
prioritizes participation in multilateral institutions so that the nation can exercise more 
decision-making or bargaining power, facilitate its domestic economic development, restrain 
the hegemony of the United States for the purpose of pushing for ‘multi-polarity’ in the 
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international system, and improve China’s international image.32 Moore notes that China’s 
increasing engagement in major multilateral institutions reflects China’s strategic and 
realpolitik considerations on the one hand, but also exhibits some liberal internationalist 
features. 33  Kissinger believes that while China has been a positive participant in the 
international system, the future of global economic order will largely depend on the Sino-U.S. 
interaction in the coming years.34 
 On the other hand, pessimistic pragmatists strongly believe that China has been 
actively participating within international institutions through a “supermarket” approach — 
“buying what it must, picking up what it wants, and ignoring what it doesn’t…[largely 
because the Chinese leaders]…see the international scene as fundamentally one of 
competition, not condominium.”35 David Shambaugh adds to this belief by stating that China 
is likely to act cautiously as a “selective multilateralist” within international institutions by 
cooperating with like-minded nations on a case-by-case basis and at the same time, trying to 
avoid too many commitments and/or entanglements.36 A report by the American National 
Intelligence Council expects that China’s cooperation with multilateral institutions in line 
with the new geopolitical landscape by 2025 is one of the key uncertainties. 37  Many 
pessimistic pragmatists share this sense of uncertainty and state that China’s pure size, rapid 
increase of power, and now, its display of growing assertiveness “represent[s] a challenge to 
the established global order and the future global multilateral architecture is far from clear 
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and not at all determined.” 38  Instead of a peaceful integration of powers within the 
international community, many scholars believe that there is always the possibility of China 
using “its influence in international institutions as a spoiler instead of a partner.”39 Some go 
as far as arguing that while China may continue to engage with global institutions, a more 
powerful China is likely to encourage “a shift from a universal conception of political values 
to recognizing diversity in human civilization, and recalibrating the multilateral order to set 
aside claims of universal civil and political rights to focus instead on solving common 
problems.”40 
 China ascertains that its selective multilateralism proves that increased multilateral 
involvement equates to increased power. Wu and Lansdowne highlight an interesting 
observation about China in the UNSC. Amongst the P5 states, China has not only positioned 
itself to be of equal stature to the four other members, but also holds three unique 
characteristics as well: the only developing, non-European heritage, and non-democratic 
country.41 Through these three interesting characteristics, it may be pointed out that China 
can be seen as an outlier and a weaker figure amongst the P5. However, Wu and Lansdowne 
argue that this distinctive position allows China to utilize it to their advantage. In other words, 
these three characteristics helps China obtain strong support from other developing nations. 
In turn, this empowers China to not have to necessarily compromise with the other P5 
members, but to stand strong and firm in its own views within the Security Council.  
 Overall, the pragmatism has become a recent interest in applying China’s foreign 
policy amongst Chinese leaders and academia. Therefore, I will mainly evaluate my case 
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studies through the lens of pragmatism and the noteworthy UNSC assessment made by Wu 
and Lansdowne. 
 
IV. China as a UNSC P5 Member: 1971-1999 
 The development of China’s role in the UNSC can be observed through four distinct 
periods.42 As a newcomer to the United Nations, the first ten years (1971-1981) involved 
China still adjusting to the UNSC’s institutional framework and struggling with peacekeeping 
decisions. This phase was characterized with numerous non-participation votes, and building 
its relationship with the other P5 members and fellow developing nation-states. The second 
phase was from 1982-1985 whereby China “fitted in more with the other permanent and non-
permanent members.” 43  During the third phase of 1986-1990, China had more or less 
adjusted to the end of the Cold War and was willing to work more closely with other 
permanent members by help shaping “the 1987 Chapter VII resolution which tried to find a 
way of resolving the Iran-Iraq war.”44 During the final post-Cold War phase leading up to 
1999, China provided a distinctive view through abstentions than vetoes. China abstained on 
several Chapter VII resolutions — delivery of humanitarian assistance; the setting up of the 
tribunal on Rwanda; a call for ceasefire in Kosovo; and the creation of the Human Rights 
Office. These four phases portray how China’s main concerns were centered towards human 
rights and peacekeeping enforcement operations, suggesting that the notion of state 
sovereignty was most important. Morphet argues that China most likely normally abstains 
rather than vetoes because it wishes to keep the Security Council intact. I argue against 
Morphet’s findings by highlighting the 1997 and 1999 vetoes as strong examples. 
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 Nigel Thalakada focuses on a more limited time frame, from 1990 to 1995. 1990 was 
immediately after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre and the Gulf War was a prominent 
issue. The author analyzes the following voting patterns of China: (1) abstentions on 
resolutions invoking Chapter VII enforcement powers, (2) abstentions on non-Chapter VII 
resolutions, and (3) Chapter VII resolutions that China affirmed, with or without 
reservations.45 Thalakada echoes Morphet’s findings, but provides more concrete evidence. 
From 1990 to 1995, China was reluctant to support Chapter VII resolutions as it abstained to 
retain a neutral status on sensitive issues regarding threats to international peace and security. 
Most of China’s voting behavior aimed to promote its internal economic goals. Since the 
1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, China needed to rebuild relationships with its trade 
partners. China supported all ten resolutions for the Gulf War, ultimately helping China 
regain the international community’s approval. Since then, China has often abstained on the 
United States’ unilateral adventurist resolutions that recommended the use of force. These 
cases specifically refer to Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda. Thalakada emphasizes 
that China valued the Westphalian notion of absolute state sovereignty, and in some cases 
threatened UNSC members with the hidden vetoes. In response to Thalakada’s analysis, I am 
interested in China’s use of the hidden veto from 1997 to 2008, and also, I highlight the 
similarities of the 199-2003 and 1990-1995 voting record. 
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FIVE 
THE SELFISH VETOES: 1997 AND 1999 VETOES 
 
I. Guatemala 
 Known as the longest civil war in Latin American history, the Guatemalan Civil War 
(1960-1996) was fought between the Guatemalan government and various leftist insurgent 
groups. During the 36 years of warfare, not only were 200,000 people killed, but also 
innumerable human rights violations were caused. In 1994, the GA initiated a ten-year 
humanitarian mission called the UN Human Rights Verification Mission in Guatemala 
(MINUGUA) in order to facilitate the peace process. This in turn led to the signing of peace 
agreements between the Guatemalan government and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional 
Guatemalteca (URNG) in December 1996. 
 On 10 January 1997, China was the only member that vetoed the draft resolution 
concerning peace efforts in Guatemala. 46  If passed, the draft resolution would have 
authorized the three-month deployment of 155 UN military observers to verify the 4 
December 1996 cease-fire agreement between the Guatemalan Government and the URNG. 
The designated observers would have formed a military constituent of MINUGUA to verify 
the following: (1) the separation of forces, (2) the demobilization of 3,000 URNG combatants, 
(3) the constitutional and electoral reforms agreed upon in the 7 December 1996 Stockholm 
Agreement, and (4) the integration of the URNG members into Guatemala’s political life as 
agreed in the 12 December 1996 Madrid Pact. Sponsored by twelve states, the draft 
resolution sought to successfully end the 35-year armed conflict between the Guatemalan 
Government and the URNG. 
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 China opposed the resolution for one major reason – Guatemala’s friendly 
relationship with Taiwan. China specifically raised two recent instances that caused it to 
object the draft resolution. First, the Guatemalan Government supported Taiwan 
diplomatically for four consecutive years, disregarding China’s repeated warnings. Second, 
Guatemala invited Taiwanese authorities to the Peace Agreement signing ceremony in 
Guatemala. Explaining China’s veto, China was very explicit and candid about its veto 
position, stating, “the Guatemalan authorities cannot expect to have the cooperation of China 
in the Security Council while taking actions to infringe upon China’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity.”47 According to China, these two actions disregarded the UN Charter’s 
purpose and principles, infringed upon China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and 
impeded its internal affairs. China’s representative emphasized that any country’s peace 
process should never be at the expense of another state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Mr. Qin Huasun, China’s representative to the UNSC, then elaborated on the question of 
Taiwan: 
There is but one China in the world and the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China is the sole legal Government representing the entire Chinese people. The 
question of Taiwan is a major question of principle that bears upon China’s 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and the cause of national reunification. It falls entirely 
within China’s internal affairs and brooks no outside interference whatsoever. The 
Chinese Government has no room for compromise on this question.48 
 
The statement concluded with the possibility of reconsideration if the Government of 
Guatemala were more sincere in its relations with China. China’s national interest regarding 
Taiwan made a bold warning, not only to Guatemala, but also to the world. 
 Guatemala was fully aware that China would most likely veto, and so the Guatemalan 
representative was the meeting’s first speaker. The representative acknowledged the bilateral 
relationship with Taiwan as an example of Guatemala’s constructive motivation to engage 
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with friendly countries. Guatemala clarified that its bilateral relationship had never intended 
to interfere in the internal affairs of any other state, and its friendly conduct followed the 
Charter’s principles. He concluded the speech by urging the UNSC members to fulfill their 
responsibilities accordingly to the Charter, and not allow unrelated bilateral issues hinder 
their decisions. 
 After the vote, the US, Costa Rica, Russia, and China made a few remarks regarding 
the vote. The US representative, Mr. Gnehm, expressed disappointment with China’s failure 
to acknowledge the needs for regional peace in Central America over some unrelated matters. 
Costa Rica strongly condemned China’s veto stating that the non-deployment of the UN 
military observers would not damage Guatemala or Central America, but instead would cause 
damage to the United Nations’ integrity. Russia and the United States publicized their intent 
to continue contributing towards consolidating peace in Guatemala. Russia regretted the draft 
had been hastily brought to a vote, not spending enough time for further negotiations that 
may have led to a unanimous vote. 
 China’s first veto in 25 years was solely based on the question of Taiwan. China took 
this opportunity to make a strong statement to the world. No state can expect to have the 
cooperation of China if it diplomatically supported Taiwan. The question of internal affairs of 
a sovereign state remains as the important foundation of China’s fixed position in the UNSC. 
 
II. Macedonia 
 The 1999 Kosovo War highly destabilized the region as 360,000 ethnic Albanians 
fled from Kosovo to seek refuge in Macedonia. Established on 31 March 1995, the UN 
Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP)’s mandate was to report developments in the 
border areas to ensure stability in the region. Satisfied with the success, the UNSC continued 
to extend the UNPREDEP mandate up to five times until 28 February 1999. 
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 The 25 February 1999 draft resolution concerning the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia saw 13 voting in favor, China voting against, and Russia abstaining. China’s veto 
impeded the UNSC authorization of extending the UNPREDEP in Macedonia for an extra six 
months until 31 August 1999. The UNPREDEP had successfully prevented the conflicts from 
spreading elsewhere in the region, thus the Secretary-General had recommended the UNSC 
to authorize an extension. He was concerned that Kosovo’s violence could possibly escalate 
to an all-out civil war, which could cause undesired consequences, especially for Macedonia, 
given the large ethnic Albanian population. The eight-Power draft resolution aimed to extend 
the UNPREDEP’s mission of stabilization and prevention of spillover conflicts. Russia 
abstained because it felt that the UNPREDEP’s function should focus on monitoring the arms 
embargo, and its suggested amendments that were not incorporated in the draft resolution. 
 Before the vote, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia representative reminded 
that the UNSC under the UN Charter must act on behalf of the member states, not of an 
individual state. Like Guatemala who supported Taiwan, Macedonia anticipated a possible 
veto by China and so pronounced, “in the case of UNPREDEP … the extension of its 
mandate is supported by all — I repeat, all — Member States except one, and that because of 
bilateral considerations, something that we all consider to be in full contradiction of the 
Charter of our Organization.”49 
 China vetoed the resolution for a number of reasons as expressed after the vote. First, 
China insisted that the UN peacekeeping operations should never be open-ended. Second, the 
Secretary-General’s words indicated that the original goal of the UNSC in establishing the 
preventive mission in Macedonia has already been fulfilled since the situation in Macedonia 
“has apparently stabilized in the past few years,” which made the extension of UNPREDEP 
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mandate no longer necessary. 50 Third, China diverted attention to other regions such as 
Africa that are plagued by similar conflicts, and stressed that the already insufficient UN 
resources should be more dedicated to these areas. The fourth and most important reason was 
not explicitly vocalized by China but mentioned by other member states; Macedonia had 
diplomatic bilateral ties with Taiwan. For instance, during the meeting, Canada strongly 
asserted that China’s action appeared to be “compelled by bilateral concerns unrelated to 
UNPREDEP.”51 
 Member states, notably the United States, Slovenia, Canada, Germany, and Bulgaria 
harshly criticized China’s veto. Slovenia was convinced that there was a genuine need to 
reform the Council and the veto because it was abused once again by China. Canada 
denounced China’s veto, which was obviously compelled by bilateral concerns entirely 
unrelated to the UNPREDEP’s mission. Germany and Bulgaria reiterated the ultimate 
responsibility of the UNSC, which is to serve the international interest, as opposed to the 
national interest, in stability in the region to which Macedonia belonged. 
 
### 
 
 Overall, from the two cases above, it can be stated that the vetoes exercised during the 
meetings regarding Guatemala and Macedonia were made solely to China’s national interests. 
China’s voting behavior during this time can simply be understood in the context of 
deteriorating cross-Strait relations in the mid-1990s. During this period, Taiwan’s president, 
Lee Teng-hui, adopted his ‘two states theory’ (两国论 liǎng guó lùn) of making pro-
independence remarks on trips to the United States, and seeking a more visible profile within 
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the international community, including the United Nations.52 Thus, enraged China went so 
far as to cast solo vetoes on otherwise controversial subjects in the UNSC just to punish states 
that welcomed Lee’s proposal for closer diplomatic relationships. 
                                                 
52 Lee Teng-hui, “Understanding Taiwan: Bridging the Perception Gap,” Foreign Affairs 78 (1999): 9-14. 
27 
 
SIX 
REBUILDING ITS REPUTATION: BETWEEN 1999 AND 2006 
 
 After the humiliating 1999 veto, China focused on rebuilding its reputation, and 
refrained from using the veto for seven years. Within this second phase, there is a distinct 
pattern in China’s voting pattern. First, from May 1999 to December 2000, China abstained 
in six resolutions, which primarily concerned Kosovo and the admission of new members to 
the UN. Second, China constantly voted in favor on various draft resolutions from January 
2001 to June 2004. The first two stages highly resemble China’s UNSC actions from 1990 to 
1995, a period of occasional abstentions and repeated positive votes to rebuild international 
support. Third, from July 2004 to 2006, China abstained six times on Sudan, and two times 
when Middle Eastern conflict was the agenda item. In this third stage, China also boldly used 
the hidden veto to oppose adding India and Japan as additional permanent members to the 
UNSC.  
China boldly used its veto against Guatemala and Macedonia in 1997 and 1999, 
primarily because of their diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The disappointed international 
community harshly criticized China’s vetoes that were based on the question of Taiwan. For 
instance, in harsh criticism, US ambassador to the UN told the Council that China had “sided 
with horrible regimes and its brutal suppression” in their own national interest.53 In response, 
China changed to a more lenient strategy. On 25 June 1999, the UNSC admitted Nauru to UN 
membership, and on 14 February 2000, it welcomed Tuvalu as a new UN member. Both 
Nauru and Tuvalu had diplomatic ties with Taiwan, and if China had not changed its policy, 
China would have vetoed both draft  
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Table 3. China’s abstention record since 1997 
YEAR DATE AGENDA ITEM VOTING RECORD 
1997 
3/28 Albania 14-0-1 
6/19 Albania 14-0-1 
10/23 Iraq-Kuwait 10-0-5 
7/11 Zimbabwe 9-5-1 
1998 
3/31 Kosovo 14-0-1 
9/23 Kosovo 14-0-1 
10/24 Kosovo 13-0-2 
11/17 Int’l Tribunal – Yugoslavia 14-0-1 
11/25 Haiti 13-0-2 
1999 
5/14 Kosovo 13-0-2 
6/10 Kosovo 14-0-1 
6/25 Admission of Nauru to UN 14-0-1 
12/17 Iraq-Kuwait 11-0-4 
2000 
2/14 Admission of Tuvalu to UN 14-0-1 
12/19 Afghanistan 13-0-2 
-------------------------No abstentions in 2001, 2002, and 2003----------------
---------- 
2004 
7/30 Sudan 13-0-2 
9/2 Middle East – Lebanon 9-0-6 
9/18 Sudan 11-0-4 
2005 
3/29 Sudan 12-0-3 
3/31 Sudan 11-0-4 
2006 
4/25 Sudan 12-0-3 
5/17 Middle East situation 13-0-2 
8/31 Sudan 12-0-3 
2007 5/30 Middle East situation 10-0-5 
-------------------------------------No abstentions in 2008------------------------
------------- 
2009 12/23 Peace & Security in Africa 13-1-1 
2010 10/14 Sudan 14-0-1 
2011 
3/17 Libya 10-0-5 
12/5 Peace & Security in Africa 13-0-2 
 
resolutions. However, China decided to abstain in both cases. I argue that there are two 
reasons for this. First, China was rebuilding its image to a more responsible global player. If 
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China vetoed against Nauru and Tuvalu, it would have only reinforced an image of China as 
a selfish P5 member only concerned with national interests. Second, China realized that it is 
not worth the effort of rejecting Nauru and Tuvalu’s membership to the UN. Although they 
had diplomatic ties with Taiwan, they are such small and insignificant countries to China that 
it was better to abstain and save face. 
 In another instance, China’s attempt to rebuild its image is well highlighted in the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1333.54 This resolution enforced wide measures against Taliban 
authorities in Afghanistan by calling on them to stop providing sanctuary and training camps 
for international terrorists, and to turn over Osama bin Laden.55 China defended its abstention 
by comparing the continued use of sanctions to a double-edged sword — the possibility of 
harming innocent people and aggravating their plight. However, underneath the surface, I 
argue that China in reality did not want to undermine its improving relations with 
Afghanistan and offend the Taliban by supporting the resolution, nor antagonize the United 
States and other Western countries by vetoing the resolution.  
From January 2001 to June 2004, China did not veto or abstain, and maintained a 
record of positive votes. This is similar to the phenomenon Thalakada observed when China 
supported most resolutions to gain the support of the international community. During a time 
of its highest economic boom, China focused on building strong economic relationships with 
trade partners. 
 After July 2004, China became bolder with abstentions and the hidden vetoes. During 
this period, China repeatedly abstained on draft resolutions regarding Sudan and the Middle 
East. For example, China boldly abstained on two draft resolutions on the withdrawal of 
                                                 
54 U.N. Security Council, 4251st Meeting. “Resolution 1333 (2000) [Afghanistan]" (S/RES/1333). December 19, 
2000. (Mimeo). 
55 Ibid. 
30 
 
Syria’s forces from Lebanon.5657 Here, China defended its abstention by claiming that the 
situation in Lebanon manifested from the nation’s internal affairs and thus should be settled 
internally without any interference from the UN. On the contrary, there was an obvious 
hidden agenda of rebuilding its image within the international community while at the same 
time, regaining its confidence and support from fellow nations. Either way, China refused to 
take a stand. Furthermore, China abstained in matters regarding issues in Darfur (ex. 
Resolutions 1556, 1564, 1591, 1593, and 1672). Generally, the draft resolutions listed above 
called for mandating travel and financial sanctions on Sudan under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. Again, China employed its usual defense statement, that Darfur was another case 
like that of Lebanon’s and should be resolved internally within the Sudanese government 
with assistance from its respective regional organizations like the African Union. Through its 
abstention strategy, China was able to save its relationships with Sudan, as well as rebuilding 
its image by appeasing the disappointed international community. 
In all of these abstentions, I must note that China was not a solo abstainer, implying 
that China won support from other non-permanent member states. The most notable ones 
concerned the Middle East situation. On 2 September 2004, nine voted in favor while six 
abstained, and on 20 May 2007, ten voted in favor while five abstained to pass the draft 
resolution.58 This is a striking difference when compared to the abstention records from 1997 
to 2000, in which China was the single abstaining voter in eight out of fourteen cases. The 
most notable hidden veto was in spring 2005, when China signaled that it would veto any 
resolution that recommended adding Japan and India as UNSC permanent members. This is a 
significant example of the hidden veto that ultimately prevented adopting the UNSC reform 
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as an agenda item. China was also aware that other P5 members were wary about expanding 
the UNSC, so it confidently publicized the hidden veto to control the UNSC agenda. 
 
### 
 
 The second phase (May 1999-2006) can be divided into three stages of rebuilding 
China’s self-image in the international community. First, China loosened its policy when 
dealing with Taiwan-friendly nations (May 1999-December 2000). Second, China did not 
cast any vetoes and abstentions to fully support the international community’s consensus 
(January 2001-June 2004). Third, China was more confident and strongly supported by other 
nations and so began abstaining again in July 2004. This regained confidence eventually led 
to an assertive veto in January 2007. 
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SEVEN 
THE CONFIDENT VETOES: 2007 AND 2009 VETOES 
 
I. Myanmar 
 For the first time in 30 years, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) 
government held a free election in May of 1990. Although the National League for 
Democracy (NLD) led by DawAung San SuuKyi won by an 80% majority vote, SLORC 
abrogated the results and stayed in control. Since then, the military junta imprisoned NLD 
supporters and leaders including Kyi. According to the International Labor Organization, an 
estimated 800,000 citizens are forced to labor in Myanmar.59 By 2007, the per capita GDP 
was less than half of its value in 1989 of about $237. Additionally, inflation had risen more 
than five-fold between 2000 and 2007.60 Furthermore, with the raft of political and economic 
challenges catalyzed from the state-sponsored violence, the HIV/AIDS rates had risen to 1.3% 
of the population in 2005, and malnutrition affected about 20% of the children.61 
 On 12 January 2007, the UNSC voted on the draft resolution concerning the situation 
in Myanmar. The draft resolution, sponsored by the US and UK, failed to pass as nine voted 
in favor, three voted against (China, Russia, and South Africa), and three abstained (Congo, 
Indonesia, and Qatar). If adopted, the resolution would have urged Myanmar’s Government 
to end military attacks against citizens in ethnic minority regions and commence a 
constructive political dialogue for a peaceful democratic transition. The draft also would have 
called on Myanmar to make concrete progress on the following: (1) allow freedom of 
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expression, (2) release political prisoners including DawAung San SuuKyi, (3) lift all 
constraints on political leaders and citizens, (4) allow political parties such as the National 
League for Democracy to operate freely, and (5) support the Secretary-General’s efforts to 
fully enable his “good offices” mission. The representative from Myanmar was delighted 
with the failed resolution. 
 China departed from its normal pattern of avoiding the use of the veto within this 
draft resolution.62 While it supported the Secretary-General’s good offices under the General 
Assembly’s mandate, China voted against this resolution for three main reasons. First, the 
matter was an internal affair of a sovereign state. Second, it did not threaten international 
peace and security. Third, UNSC’s involvement in Myanmar would exceed its mandate and 
also hinder other relevant UN agencies’ operations in Myanmar.  
 On 15 September 2006, China strongly argued against placing the issue of Myanmar 
on the Security Council’s agenda. China claimed that it was “contrary to logic” to consider 
problems such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic, drug trafficking, and refugee issues as threats, 
since doing so “not only exceeds the mandate given by the Charter to the Council, but will 
also undermine the Council’s authority and legitimacy.”63 China also contended that the role 
of the international community was to “encourage Myanmar” and “create a favorable 
environment in the country,” which it posited could best be accomplished through the “good 
offices” visits of Ibrahim Gambari.64 
 Again, on 12 January 2007, China made similar arguments and defended its veto use 
by stating that despite Myanmar’s shortcomings, “similar problems exist in many other 
countries.” Instead, China added that the UN should play a facilitator role of political 
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reconciliation through “a process of dialogue and engagement, which needs time and 
patience.”65 
Russia and South Africa also voted against the draft resolution for this third reason. In 
their position statement, they voiced that the issues raised by the draft would be best left to 
the Human Rights Council and emphasized that it was beyond the UNSC’s mandate. South 
Africa also added that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) ministers agreed 
on 11 January 2007 that Myanmar was indeed not a threat to regional peace and security. 
Three other countries abstained in the voting process. Indonesia, Qatar, and Congo fully 
acknowledged Myanmar’s critical issue, but were hesitant about the UNSC’s effectiveness 
and appropriateness in addressing the issue. They also similarly believed that the internal 
issue was not a threat to international peace and security. The representative from Myanmar 
was highly satisfied with the outcome. He said Russia and China’s vetoes were completely 
justifiable, and further expressed appreciation to the four member states that had either voted 
against the draft or abstained. 
 After refraining from use of the veto for eight years, China voted against a draft 
resolution. Unlike the vetoes in 1997 and 1999, China’s negative vote was accompanied by 
abstentions and negative votes by other elected member states and Russia. This is a dramatic 
change compared to its last veto, and shows the substantive support for China by other 
African and Southeast Asian states. A year and a half later China and Russia, vetoed a 
resolution together, again. 
 
II. Zimbabwe 
 Zimbabwe experienced a similar decline to that of Myanmar. Throughout the late 
1990s, Zimbabwe was not only a middle-ranked developing country with GDP numbers 
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ranking between Honduras and Latvia, but also had the highest education level per capita in 
Africa and showcased a strong agricultural and tourism sectors.66 Zimbabwe’s leader, Robert 
Mugabe had ruled the state as Prime Minister and President since 1980. However, as Robert 
Mugabe and his Zimbabwe Africa National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) grew 
increasingly corrupt and hostile towards its people, Zimbabwe increasingly began to suffer 
from a myriad of problems including hyperinflation, human rights abuses, the spreading of 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, increasing infant mortality rate, diminishing life expectancy rate, and 
failing land reforms. On 29 March 2008, Zimbabwe held a presidential election, but results 
were disclosed weeks later. It was generally acknowledged that Morgan Tsvangiri of the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party won, but Robert Mugabe and his party the 
ZANU-PF continued to maintain control. For instance, Mugabe responded by electoral 
intimidation, intermittent arrests of Tsvangiri and his supporters, and a policy of land 
annexation from white farmers.67  
As political strife within the nation led to severe humanitarian conditions, by 2006, 
Zimbabwe faced 1000% inflation, an unemployment rate of 85%, a poverty rate higher than 
90%, one of the world’s highest infant mortality rates, and an HIV/AIDS rate of about one-
fifth of the adult population.68 Thus, the UNSC convened to discuss the crux of the matter – 
the 2008 presidential election dispute of Zimbabwe. 
 In 11 July 2008, China and Russia vetoed a Chapter VII resolution regarding the 
conflict in Zimbabwe. Nine members voted in favor, five against (China, Libya, Russia, 
South Africa, and Vietnam), and Indonesia abstained. The resolution intended to impose 
sanctions, arms embargoes, a travel ban, and a financial freeze against Zimbabwe’s President 
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and his 13 senior government officials deemed responsible for the country’s violence. If 
passed, the draft text would have declared Zimbabwe’s situation as a threat to international 
peace and security, and would have called the Government of Zimbabwe to immediately 
cease its violence against opposition members. By encouraging a comprehensive dialogue 
between the parties, the twelve-power draft resolution aimed to bring a peaceful solution that 
reflects the true will of the Zimbabwean citizens.  
 The representative of Zimbabwe spoke first and called for member states to reject the 
draft resolution. He made three simple arguments. First, he argued that the UK and their allies 
had distorted the image of Zimbabwe as “a lawless, disorderly and undemocratic country 
(Press Release 8). Second, the situation in Zimbabwe is not a security threat to the region as 
agreed by the African Union and the Southern African Development Community. Third, 
sanctions and arms embargoes would only discourage political dialogue, causing the situation 
to be possibly worse. After this speech, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Libya expressed their 
inability to support the resolution, and Burkina Faso conveyed their support for the draft. The 
permanent members did not speak until the vote revealed the failure of the draft due to two 
vetoes. 
 Russia and China together again voted against the resolution with two main 
justifications. First, yet again, it was an interference of another sovereign state’s internal 
affairs. Second, it was another attempt to take the UNSC beyond its Charter mandate and 
mission of focusing solely on international peace and security. China further noted that 
mediation efforts sponsored by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) were 
continuing, and said that the Council should “respect the position of African countries” in 
favor of further talks and against the use of outside pressure. 69  In other words, China 
emphasized that by voting against the resolution, they were fully respecting the Africa’s 
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regional position of encouraging more constructive dialogue and not pressuring Zimbabwe 
into a critical situation. China also mentioned that most African leaders had clearly stated 
their position against any sanction on Zimbabwe at the previous G-8 Hokkaido Toyako 
Summit, thereby criticizing that “lightly using or threatening to use sanctions is not 
conducive to solving problems.”70 China received no direct criticism, whereas Russia was 
criticized by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France for making a U-turn decision 
against what was supposedly “agreed at the G-8 summit.” Russia denied this accusation 
underlining that, at the G-8, there had been no reference to the UNSC actions. 
 
 
### 
 
 In sum, the political dynamics of the two cases went in favor of China. Compared to 
the 2007 case of Myanmar, the Zimbabwe situation saw a larger number of negative votes 
and fewer abstention votes. This implied that more member states are confidently saying “No” 
to a resolution they were against. Interestingly, the United States did not exert significant 
pressure on China on during both issues regarding Myanmar and Zimbabwe. This is because 
the United States required China’s undue cooperation on a range of strategically important 
issues, thereby not exerting high-level pressure on China’s support for the Western initiatives. 
Additionally, with Russia’s position aligned with China, it may also be evidence that China 
and Russia’s relationship is further maturing. Furthermore, with major regional stakeholders 
— grouped respectively within ASEAN and SADC —offered no support for Western efforts 
in applying sanctions to Myanmar and Zimbabwe, China may well be building a stronger 
diplomatic alliance with other countries, especially the developing countries in Southeast 
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Asia and Africa. This in turn not only highlights China’s affinity with regional organizations, 
but also showcases a way to build confidence in Southeast Asia and southern Africa. Also, 
compared to the two vetoes of the late 1990s, the question of Taiwan was never raised in 
2007 and 2008 cases. Yet, the idea of China confidently placing vetoes plays out at even a 
larger scale for the crisis in Syria.  
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EIGHT 
THE STUBBORN VETOES: THRICE ON SYRIA 
 
 The revolutionary wave of the Arab Spring inundated Syria on 15 March 2011. With 
protestors demanding both the end of the five-decade long Ba’ath Party rule and the 
resignation of Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s nationwide uprising has led to today’s ongoing 
internal armed conflict now known as the Syrian Civil War. By responding to the anti-
government protests with overwhelming military force, the Syrian authorities have resorted to 
mass killings. According to the UN, approximately 19,105 – 26,700 civilians and armed 
combatants have been killed, while 500,000 to 1.0 million Syrians have been displaced within 
the country.71 This ongoing civil war-like manifestation is posing the greatest challenge to the 
dictatorial Assad family rule. 
 On 4 October 2011, China and Russia, again, double-vetoed a Chapter VII resolution 
regarding the situation in Syria. Nine members voted in favor, two against, and four abstained 
(Brazil, India, Lebanon, and South Africa). The resolution would have issued an official 
admonishment of “the continued grave and systematic human rights violations and the use of 
force against civilians by the Syrian authorities,” as well as financial sanctions for the 
ongoing oppression and corruption.72 If passed, the draft text would have declared Syria’s 
situation as a threat to international peace and security, and would have called on the Syrian 
Government to immediately cease its violence and mass killings. 
 As leaders globally have expressed outrage and horror over the mass killings in Syria, 
within four months, another draft resolution was placed upon the UNSC members on 4 
February 2012. Even though the resolution had been watered down to accede to Russian 
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demands to cut a voluntary arms embargo and an estimated 3,000 civilians were added to the 
total death toll, Russia and China once again double-vetoed. If passed, the resolution would 
have called for “all parties in Syria — both Government forces and armed opposition groups 
— to [immediately] stop all violence and reprisals.”73 China firmly defended its vote by 
claiming that the international community should provide “constructive assistance” and 
support the Arab League’s “good office” efforts to restore stability in Syria, “rather than 
complicate the [Syrian] issue.”74 
 Even though both Russia and China vetoed twice against resolutions dealing with the 
crisis in Syria, other members of the UNSC denounced the previous votes made by the two 
nations and recently tried for a third time. On 19 July 2012, the UNSC held another meeting 
to discuss a British-sponsored resolution chastising the Syrian government with economic 
sanctions for failing to execute a peace plan. However, diplomatic efforts to address the 
Syrian situation once again suffered a fatal blow as China and Russia vetoed the resolution 
for the third time. Many around the world were disappointed that the UNSC could not unite 
and take a strong concerted action during this critical time. 
 All three times, although China stated that they were very concerned with the 
developments in Syria and hoped for various parties within the nation to exercise restraint to 
avoid further bloodshed, China stubbornly voted against the resolutions for four main reasons. 
First, the central reason behind the veto on Syria seems to have been from what has been 
renowned as the “Libya hangover effect.”China was very displeased with the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) overstepping the mandate stated in the Libyan resolution during 
the execution of its Libya operation.75 Drawing a parallel between the Libyan and Syrian 
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situations, China, therefore, expressed fears in intervention leading to a full-fledged war for 
Syria. 
Second, China firmly values the concepts of “state sovereignty” and “non-
intervention”and often criticizes any diplomatic statements regarding interference in domestic 
affairs made by the West. Thus, China has frequently stubbornly refused to authorize 
international action in many cases.76 In this case, the veto was therefore in line with China’s 
general beliefs on non-interventionism.  
Third, though never officially stated, China does have strong interests in Syria and 
could have very well been protecting an ally from spiteful international measures. Unlike 
Russia’s strong political ties to Syria, China’s relationship with Syria is more economically-
based. This is because China has significant investments in the Syrian oil fields.  Perhaps due 
to reasons of investments and a newfound ally in the Middle East, China likely viewed the 
possibility of sanctions as unacceptable. 77  Although Russia heavily emphasized the 
possibility of repeating the Libyan intervention in Syria as its reason for vetoing the Syrian 
resolution, China was more concerned with the possible sanctions, claiming that these 
measures would add to further hurting Syria.78 
Lastly, China’s stance against the Syria resolution is without a doubt tied to the 
nation’s domestic concerns. In other words, a strong attitude against intervention in another 
nation’s internal unrest is a reflection of opposition to foreign interference in any of their own 
domestic affairs. It is highly possible that any reluctance for becoming involved in another’s 
“internal affairs” may stem from “a fear of attracting international attention to its own 
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conflicts in Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang.”79 Evidently, China’s own internal unrest is not one 
for which wants to be criticized by the international community. This is because China is 
well-known for taking quick action and subduing protests by dispatching as many security 
forces as there are protestors. Especially with overseas activists planning to launch a Jasmine 
Revolution (茉莉花革命 mòlìhuā gémìng) 80 following the Arab Spring, China has especially 
been hypersensitive to any sort of domestic remonstrance towards the government. Therefore, 
it does not want the UN to ever interfere in its own governance and sovereignty. 
 
 
 
### 
 
Be that as it may, China claims to have vetoed in order to help Syria ensure peace and 
order. Had the resolution passed, China feared that there would be further riots and more 
killings within Syria. The three consecutive vetoes on Syria have reopened the question on 
the value of UN as an international diplomat and peacemaker. Although putting whatever 
interests aside and taking a mutual stance along with the United States and Britain may have 
won China greater respectability from the international community, China stubbornly stuck to 
its veto. 
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NINE 
CONCLUSION 
 
I. Summing Up 
China’s participation in the UN reflects its increasingly engaging and active foreign 
policy. Since the 1990s, China’s involvement in the UN has continued to increase. For 
instance, President Hu Jintao expressed his support for the UN in solving security issues,81 
while Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing noted, “the hope of the world rests on a strong UN.”82 
This change demonstrates a transition from being a “suspicious and non-participatory” nation, 
to “passively involved with reservations,” to being a “more active and conscious advocate of 
multilateralism.”83 
Throughout this paper, I have distinctively outlined China’s four phases in the UNSC 
through its voting records from 1997 to 2012. During the first phase of the 1997 and 1999 
vetoes, China legitimized the issue of Taiwan as its reason to veto. At this time, the 
international community severely condemned China for employing selfish reasons for its veto 
and questioned China’s role as a P5 member. During the second phase, China attempted to 
regain its image as a responsible global leader by abstaining its veto power between 1999 and 
2006. Not only did China become a bit more lenient on the issue of Taiwan, but China also 
gradually became more assertive in its voting and manipulation of the hidden veto. In this 
phase, based on the voting records, China’s use of abstentions was casted along with fellow 
UNSC members — clearly indicating China’s gradual support and acceptance from the other 
members. Moreover, at this time of rebuilding its reputation, China started establishing 
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powerful relationships through various regional multilateral organizations like the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the African Union (AU). Through the 
strong support and newfound relationships made during the second phase, in the third and 
fourth phases, China regained its confidence and began to cast vetoes through justifiable 
means; for example, emphasizing each nation’s right to sovereignty. But were the resolutions 
regarding Syria gained from confidence? Did too much confidence bring back selfish means? 
The analyses of various Chinese veto case studies delineated above showcased strong 
evidence to support the pragmatist views of China’s role in the UNSC. The case studies 
illustrated above suggest that unlike what the realists think, China does not harbor grandiose 
objectives of overthrowing the current international framework. Rather, China has played a 
big role and blended well within the existing international order. Over the years, China has 
shown confidence in the use of its veto for pragmatic objectives, for instance, balancing the 
predominant power of the West with the voices from the developing countries, having a 
strong stance on key international crises, increasing its authority in the international political 
scene, constantly developing its global image, and striving to increase cooperation in global 
matters that serves its own interests. 
Still in its early stages of participation in the UN, China is undergoing an intense 
debate on whether it should modify or completely abandon Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Bide our Time, 
Build our Capacities’ (韬光养晦 tāo guāng yǎng huì), also known as ‘low profile’ 
international strategy. Until this question of possible reform is resolved, China’s multilateral 
policy is likely to some extent be influenced by this low profile foreign policy. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that China’s pragmatic means of foreign diplomacy will be absent. 
On the contrary, various cases within its recent years in the UNSC indicate that China has 
been attempting to play a bigger role in its multilateral diplomacy. Although the overly 
cautious pessimist school of thought has argued that China’s involvement within the 
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international arena tends to be highly selective, the nation still treats the UN as the most vital 
international organization in the area of international security and global governance.  
As a firm believer in China’s pragmatic rise within the international system, the 
ultimate goal for China is to secure the Chinese interests and compete for more decision-
making power upon the global stage. The various case studies delineated throughout this 
paper provide strong support to assert the following argument:  China’s voting behavior in 
the UNSC strongly support China’s pragmatism in multilateralism; to continue high 
economic growth and relationship building, China has become highly sensitive to the 
changing international norms and constraints of multilateralism, while gaining international 
support especially from the developing countries of Africa and Southeast Asia. China is 
consistently aware of the UNSC mandate, and will continue to vote with firm positions on 
state sovereignty and internal affairs, clearly because China has a strong interest and desire to 
avoid foreign intervention in its own affairs. 
 
II. What’s next? 
A deeper analysis of China’s 1997-2008 abstention records would benefit this paper.  
This paper still leaves unanswered questions such as: Is this a result of China successfully 
gaining genuine support from other states, or has China gained enough power to manipulate 
other states’ votes?  These are questions I would like to explore in future research. 
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